TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/082790/0827016.000

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                z>                                                          THE GULF, Page 14

COVER STORIES

Must This Mean War?


Not necessarily. Before the fighting starts, the U.S. should try
to craft a diplomatic way out.

By MICHAEL KRAMER -- Reported by David Aikman and Bruce van
Voorst/ Washington and Jon D. Hull/Jerusalem


    If peace was at hand anywhere last week, it was on another
planet. None of the actions and words of Saddam Hussein and
those who would stop him were the least bit subtle, and all
pointed toward war. The verbal posturing of two weeks ago gave
way to bullying; defensive deployments took on an offensive
cast; compromise was shunned as if it were a four-letter word;
those in the know saw no hope.

    In Baghdad, Saddam's smooth, low-key Foreign Minister, Tariq
Aziz, complained that the U.S. was ignoring his nation's peace
proposals. On Saturday, the Iraqi government declared that the
embargo against it was "an act of war." And from the only
person who counts in Iraq, nothing was heard but bellicosity.
Dare to fight us, Saddam told the U.S., and you will have
"thousands of Americans shrouded in sad coffins." The
escalating rhetoric was accompanied by belligerent deeds.
Iraq's troop presence in Kuwait increased to 160,000, and Iraq
demanded that American and British citizens congregate in two
Kuwait City hotels. "Temporary, precautionary measures," said
Baghdad; a "grave and sinister development," said the British
Foreign Office more accurately.

    In Baghdad itself, Iraqis demonstrated outside the American
embassy for the first time since the crisis began; the speaker
of the parliament announced that Iraq would "play host" to the
citizens of "aggressive nations," including the U.S., by
dispersing them to military installations until the threat of
war passes; and potential for terrorism was heightened when
Abul Abbas, the Achille Lauro mastermind, called for his army
of thugs to "hit American interests."

    On top of all that, Saddam suddenly ended Iraq's state of
war with Iran, a stroke that apparently caught the U.S.
intelligence community off guard. "An exceedingly clever move,"
said Richard Helms, a former CIA director and U.S. ambassador
to Iran. "Iraq and Iran have much in common: hatred of the
U.S., hatred of Saudi Arabia and a desire to drive up oil
prices." Peace with Iran frees Baghdad to move more Iraqi
divisions to the Kuwaiti front, and although Tehran says it
will continue supporting the sanctions mandated by the United
Nations, it is possible that Iran could soon serve as a back
door through which the embargo could be breached.

    Meanwhile, in a frosty two-hour session with President Bush
last Thursday, Jordan's King Hussein sought to calm matters.
If anything significant was accomplished, it remains a state
secret. With street support for Saddam growing and with Jordan
deriving 40% of its GNP from trade with Iraq, Hussein sought
compensation for the revenue Amman will lose if it closes its
port of Aqaba to Iraq-destined commerce. Not until you're
actively on board the embargo, Bush told Hussein, while making
it clear that the U.S. Navy will close Aqaba if the King
dallies.

    In separate press conferences following their meeting, both
Bush and Hussein appeared sullen, and Washington's own words
and actions mirrored the pessimism. More troops, more planes,
more ships; the largest overseas deployment since Vietnam, so
large that a reserve forces call-up and the use of civilian
aircraft to ferry it all were authorized last Friday. "Stop and
search" became the fleet's new orders -- an action criticized
by even Canada and France for running ahead of the U.N.
Security Council. The very next day, U.S. naval forces fired
warning shots at two Iraqi oil tankers after they refused to
stop.

    Like Saddam's, the President's rhetoric matched his actions.
In a stinging Pentagon pep talk, aggressive and uncompromising
in tone, Bush called Saddam a liar and declared that nothing
less than "our way of life" is at stake in the gulf.

    No one should "doubt our staying power," said the President,
but that seems to be exactly what is worrying Administration
officials. "If a stalemate is the best that we have six months
from now," says a Bush adviser, "and gasoline prices have
leveled off because the Saudis have made up the lost production
from Iraq and Kuwait, why wouldn't the American people begin
to wonder why we're still there? The embargo will inevitably
leak, and the hostility of average Arabs toward us will likely
grow. The long haul may squeeze Saddam, but it is not exactly
favorable to us."

    If war does not follow this analysis, it certainly becomes
more likely. The U.S. can win a test of strength against
Saddam, but a test of wills is another matter. So the inside,
macho talk is all about unconditional surrender and a quick,
low-cost air strike to decapitate Iraq's war-fighting capacity,
if not Saddam himself. While the U.S. would welcome a pretext
for action, any American move that is construed as needlessly
provocative could cause domestic and international support to
erode rapidly. Bush and his aides believe that Saddam will not
budge until his food and supplies begin to run out. They then
expect him to lash out militarily, probably against Saudi
Arabia, but possibly against Jordanian, Israeli, Turkish or
U.S. forces. The President and his commanders are confident
that they can blunt this strike, forcing Saddam to retreat from
Kuwait. Such a humiliation, they hope, will hasten his
overthrow or, at the least, teach him a lesson.

    If there is a political scenario for a peaceful resolution,
no one is talking about it. "We are under a gag order," says
an Administration official who believes there can be no
successful resolution as long as Saddam remains in power. "But
if you want to understand the prevailing thinking, you might
consider Joe Sisco's observation." Sisco, an Under Secretary
of State in the Carter Administration, said last week that it
is "difficult to teach dictators lessons. They need to be
defeated."

    This notion that the world cannot sleep easily until Saddam
is overthrown is "madness," says Robert Tucker, a highly
regarded Middle East expert at Johns Hopkins University. In
1975 Tucker triggered a debate over the merits of a permanent
U.S. presence in the gulf, a force that would guarantee the
steady flow of oil at a reasonable price. Henry Kissinger
hinted agreement, and the idea was seriously considered by the
Ford, Carter and Reagan administrations. It was rejected because
it would have had to be imposed over Arab objections, but such
may not be the case today.

    Tucker urges a negotiated solution to the present crisis.
"For one thing," he says, "suppose we get rid of Saddam. Who
is his successor? Israeli intelligence says the younger
generals around him would be just as bad, including in their
future threat a nuclear-war option. And to break Iraq's power
might require much more than merely overthrowing Saddam, like
maybe an occupation. Nice idea, but risky . . . The idea that
we can't compromise the current situation is as nonsensical as
it is dangerous." By week's end a host of other Middle East
experts were beginning to call for a de-escalation of the
rhetoric, and brainstorming sessions designed to craft a way
out short of war were under way in the nation's think tanks.

    What kind of deal would best serve both the region's and the
world's interests? A negotiated resolution specific to the
current mess is easy enough to conjure. Egyptian President
Hosni Mubarak sketched one element last week: a retreat to Iraq
by Saddam in exchange for satisfying his grievances against
Kuwait, which largely involve that nation's drilling and oil
production practices.

    Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jimmy Carter's National Security
Adviser, distinguishes between securing the oil supply, a clear
American responsibility, and expelling Iraq from Kuwait, a task
he sees as more properly an international one, the implication
being that such a goal is not worth a costly unilateral
American military push. And although rhetoric has almost
hopelessly blurred the distinctions, there is also a big
difference between forcing Saddam out of Iraq and compelling him
to abandon Kuwait.

    The trouble with all narrow scenarios is that Saddam has
proved he cannot be trusted -- although Mubarak believes
optimistically that if he can be persuaded to leave Kuwait,
Saddam would not be foolish enough to ignore that "good lesson"
and would thereafter curb his messianic designs. Is it not more
likely that Saddam would see his aggression as having paid
handsome dividends and that he would regroup to strike again
later?

    The only resolution that could comfortably countenance
Saddam's continued rule in Baghdad must simultaneously cripple
or otherwise control his existing chemical weapons and his
potential nuclear ones. To force that stand-down without a
fight would involve a far more ambitious deal, a grand,
region-wide peace plan. Any such negotiated resolution would
have to address numerous concerns and defuse them
satisfactorily:


    FOREIGNERS. No compromise here. Americans and all other
foreigners resident in Kuwait and Iraq must be free to leave
or stay as they wish.

    KUWAIT. Iraq's occupation is unacceptable to everyone,
forever. The goal should be what Bush has stated all along: a
complete Iraqi retreat and restoration of the al-Sabah
monarchy. Free elections would be nice, and the U.S. could
support Saddam's demand that they be held, but only after the
Emir is returned. Still, the Saudi royal family is not eager
to face its subjects at the polls, and would undoubtedly see
the call for a Kuwaiti plebiscite as a precursor to elections
in Saudi Arabia.

    Saddam's complaint about Kuwait's slant drilling into Iraqi
oil fields is legitimate. A payment to Baghdad for past
deprivation and a guarantee of a more equitable distribution
of oil resources in the future is both doable and just.
Saddam's other gripes involve territorial disputes, and should
be decided by the World Court.

    SAUDI ARABIA AND OIL. As long as Saddam rules Iraq, Saudi
Arabia will feel threatened, and the free flow of reasonably
priced oil will be in jeopardy. To defend both, the U.S. --
with or without international assistance -- should consider
establishing a permanent presence in the kingdom, as Robert
Tucker envisioned 15 years ago. A trip-wire force of, say,
25,000 troops would do. Senior Saudi officials have expressed
a willingness to accept such an open-ended commitment. In large
measure, the bill for such an operation should be borne by the
Saudis, the Kuwaitis and also by Europe and Japan, whose
dependence on Middle Eastern oil dwarfs America's.

    ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS. A permanent U.S. presence in
Saudi Arabia would offend much of the Arab world. Washington
would be bashed for establishing a colonial protectorate. The
U.S. could either ignore such a reaction or seek to alleviate
it by attempting to settle the outstanding item on the Arab
agenda, the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. No equation of
Israel's occupation of the West Bank with Iraq's of Kuwait
should be stated or implied, for none is justified: Israel's
move into the West Bank was a response to the gratuitous
aggression of King Hussein in 1967. Which is not to say the
Palestinians' grievances are not real and legitimate. They will
have to be seriously addressed at some point, and this might
be the time to do so. If nothing else, the pres ent crisis
teaches that Israel and most of its Arab neighbors share a
dedication to Middle East stability and a common fear of
radical regimes.

    If there simply is no way for the Palestinian problem to be
resolved now without handing Saddam a victory he does not
deserve, then the effort should be postponed. But whenever it
comes, a settlement should involve the creation of a
demilitarized Palestinian state in some, but not all, of the
West Bank. To assuage Israeli fears, the U.S. should announce
that an attack on Israel will be considered an attack on the
U.S. Stationing a second trip-wire force of troops along the
Israel-Palestine border would add muscle to that pledge. The
Arab states -- or most of them, and certainly those that border
Israel -- should sign peace treaties with Jerusalem.

    Israel, or at least its present hard-line government, would
surely resist, which is putting it mildly. Yitzhak Shamir sees
Yasser Arafat's support of Saddam as reducing Washington's
ardor for an Israeli-Palestinian settlement -- an accurate
short-term appraisal, but nothing more. It is certain that
after the crisis abates, the moderate Arabs who are currently
standing with the U.S. against Saddam will ask Washington to
turn the resolve it has demonstrated in the gulf toward settling
the Palestinian issue -- and the Bush Administration should
respond sympathetically.

    Israelis across the ideological spectrum recoil at linking
the Saddam and Palestinian problems -- if only because Saddam
himself has posited such a linkage. But doing so could provide
the cover necessary for Saddam to scuttle the most terrifying
weapons in his arsenal. Eager to save face, he could claim that
a Palestinian settlement would have been impossible without his
actions, a stance that could yield a rationale for destroying
Iraq's chemical- and nuclear-weapons capabilities. No serious
outsider would buy such an argument, but only Saddam's citizens
would have to. Would Saddam grasp such a trade-off even if he
were universally hailed as the man who created Palestine? "The
Israelis are the biggest evil on earth," says Mohammed
al-Mashat, Iraq's ambassador to the U.S. "Not even Hitler
committed such atrocities. Hitler did not raze the houses of
people for throwing stones." Hitler, of course, did a lot
worse. Al-Mashat's fury telegraphs an implacable hostility
toward Israel, a hate that might not be sated until all of
Israel is eradicated. This piece of a grand plan would obviously
be the hardest to orchestrate.

    THE MILITARY BALANCE. Further negotiations should be
undertaken to reduce the armed forces of all countries in the
region, much like the talks in Central America, another area
bristling with outsize armies. The best way to reduce the
likelihood of adventurism is to restrict the military might
available to those who want to war.

    THE SOVIETS. While supportive now, Moscow might in the
future be tempted to meddle in the Middle East again. The
Soviets should be enlisted as co-guarantors of an overall
settlement. One minor but nonetheless significant way to tie
Gorbachev to the effort would be to have Moscow deliver the
world's demands to Iraq -- and, of course, the few contemplated
concessions as well. In addition, the Soviets should be pressed
to join actively a multinational gulf naval patrol, and as with
Syria, Moscow could declare that its shipments of spare
military parts to Baghdad will henceforth be limited to
"reasonable defensive sufficiency."


    A grand deal could offer Bush important political gains. If
the White House truly considers America's "staying power"
problematic, a wider plan could add heft to the U.S. mission
and help secure continued public support. A stable oil system
would stave off the encroachment of drilling into
environmentally important areas of the U.S. (which would be
good), lessen the need for energy conservation (which would be
bad) and possibly permit enactment of an energy tax to help
reduce the deficit (also good).

    Unrealistic, unworkable, naive? Perhaps. Time consuming to
arrange? Definitely. Not comprehensive? Of course. If Iraq were
to dismantle its chemical-and nuclear-weapons capacity, the
Arab states would surely demand that Israel follow suit. Syria
would balk at any proposal that left the Golan Heights in
Jerusalem's hands. And so on. Whole armored divisions could be
driven through the holes and loopholes in such a grand scheme.

    But the alternative is war. Casualties would be high;
hostages would be taken -- and perhaps killed; international
terrorism would soar; Israel would inevitably be drawn into the
conflict, thus further fueling Arab enmity against the West;
the use of chemical weapons by a desperate Saddam could provoke
a tactical nuclear response; the oil flow would probably be
disrupted; and the Arab world's other undemocratic states (all
of them) would be ripe for destabilization. Above all, unless
Saddam does something so brash that everyone urges war, the
U.S. will again find itself alone, and the major triumph of
events so far, a U.S-Arab alliance against Iraq, will be
shattered.

    In Chinese, the word for crisis combines the characters for
danger and opportunity. Meeting the danger is a given: if war
comes, the U.S. will prevail militarily, but only after a
tremendous expenditure of lives and treasure. Seizing the
opportunity to stabilize a region vital to the whole world's
interests without resort to war could be considered a calling.
If war breaks out without a full-fledged discussion of outcomes
short of war, then even total military victory will be a
tragedy, and the long-term prospects for peace in the Middle
East will worsen.